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Abstract
Over the past decades, numerous critiques have emerged of China’s policy towards
Africa. These critiques perceive China as a mercantilist or neocolonial power seeking to
dominate the African continent through land grabs, exploitative trade deals, and resource
extraction. These critiques do however not consider how the Chinese government has
attempted to justify its aid policy towards Africa in ways that claim to secure human
beings. Though the Chinese government has not officially adopted the concept of human
security, it has engaged with the concept and developed its own interpretation of how
human beings should be secured. This interpretation is based on the depiction of China as
a state victimized through imperialism that has emerged in the twenty-first century as a
global power with visionary ideas. Accordingly, Chinese policymakers believe they can
offer an alternative model to Western interventions, imposition of neoliberal economic
doctrine, and emphasis on democratization and human rights. In Africa, though China’s
vision has generated benefits for some, it has also victimized others. China needs to
critically reflect on and adapt its developmental vision if it truly intends to help human
beings overcome the myriad challenges they face in their daily lives.
Keywords China . Africa . Human security . Identity . Development
Introduction
Over the past 15 years, numerous critiques have emerged of China’s policy towards
Africa. Governments, media, think tanks, and scholars have criticized China’s foreign
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policy towards Africa as being self-interested, mercantilist, and failing to address
human rights concerns and the continent’s political problems. For Naim [45], China
is a specialist in “rogue aid,” namely, opaque and self-interested assistance that
undermines human security and development. Chinese assistance is often labeled a
form of neocolonialism focused on promoting Chinese business interests in and
acquiring natural resources from Africa [68]. The deals Chinese actors sign with
African states are unequal, leaving African states with inferior infrastructure that they
are reliant on Chinese firms to maintain. Taylor [66] argues that the Chinese govern-
ment “effectively legitimizes human rights abuses and undemocratic practices under the
guise of state sovereignty and ‘non-interference’” in its search for African oil (see also
[63]). China’s activities enable rogue states to survive, threatening the stability of the
international system, according to Zweig and Bi [83]. Such views have been echoed by
United States (U.S.) officials, including Johnnie Carson, the former U.S. assistant
secretary of state for Africa, who labeled China “a pernicious economic competitor
with no morals” in a commentary published on Wikileaks [56]. More recently, the
former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton [8] pointed to China’s economic
expansion and “predatory practices” as a threat to the U.S. as his speech at the Heritage
Foundation. According to Bolton
Chins uses bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use of debt to hold states
in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands. Its investment ventures are
riddled with corruption, and do not meet the same environmental or ethical
standards as U.S. developmental programs. Such predatory actions are sub-
components of broader Chinese strategic initiatives … a plan to develop a series
of trade routes leading to and from China with the ultimate goal of advancing
Chinese global dominance.
The Western media also perpetuates a view that China exploits a weak continent in
comparison to the benevolence of the West’s engagement with Africa [38].
There have been numerous responses to these charges that have sought to provide
more nuance in terms of China’s relations with Africa. First, commentators note that
China’s behavior is not so different from other (Western) states’ foreign policies
towards Africa [56]. Second, critics of China’s foreign policy towards Africa fail to
consider the multitude of Chinese actors operating on the continent and the difficulty
for Beijing in maintaining control over the behavior of these diverse actors [69]. Third,
African views of Chinese foreign policy on their continent are more positive than the
critics acknowledge, though arguably these responses are not as positive as Beijing
would like [59]. Fourth, the paternalistic Western model of engaging Africa has hardly
been successful, whereas China’s business-orientated approach does at least build
infrastructure, and provide jobs and educational opportunities for Africans [57].
What these responses have not done is to consider how the critiques of China’s
engagement with Africa rely on a specific Western understanding of human security
based on armed interventions, the imposition of neoliberal economic doctrine, and an
emphasis on democratization and human rights. Though the Chinese government has
not officially adopted the concept of human security, it has engaged with the concept
and developed its own interpretation of how human beings should be secured [12, 74].
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The aim of this paper is to understand how Chinese officials have based their interpre-
tation of human security on the depiction of China as a state victimized through
imperialism that has emerged in the twenty-first century as a global power with
visionary ideas. The narrative of China as a visionary draws primarily on a traditional
Sino-centric understanding of order and China’s developmental experience. Chinese
officials and scholars have therefore framed the concept of human security in terms of
“freedom from want” to various degrees, and adopted a developmentalist approach to
human security. These Chinese officials and scholars have tended to argue that the
essence of security should not be exclusively militarily and politically focused. This
interpretation of human security has then been deployed to justify and sustain China’s
foreign policy towards Africa in the public domain. At the same time, the discursive
foundations of China’s foreign policy towards Africa serve to undermine human
security by preventing a critical appraisal of Sino-African relations.
One of the main contributions of this paper is therefore to answer the call to
seriously engage with how human security is understood differently throughout the
world [51, 61]. As there are multiple dimensions of security, so it is essential to
critically engage with how security issues are defined and approached from specific
localities and agents rather than imposing a universal approach as some Western
advocates of human security have sought to do in terms of promoting an interventionist
interpretation of the concept. This is vital considering calls by Western leaders to end
interventionist approaches that seek to “remake the world in [their] own image” as
Western attempts at global leadership falter [6]. Can China provide global leadership
that secures human beings in an age in which Western states turn increasingly inward?
This paper begins by examining how China’s engagement with human security
draws on its self-identification in international society as both a victimized state and
visionary leader. Next, the argument explains how the Chinese government has mobi-
lized its interpretation of human security to justify its policy towards Africa. In the
subsequent section, the paper provides a critique of how the rhetoric of the Chinese
government has in turn sought to hide the victims of its policy towards Africa. By way
of conclusion, the article argues that it is important to understand the discursive
foundations of Chinese approaches to human security and how they inform China’s
policy towards Africa. While acknowledging that China’s foreign policy towards
Africa has been beneficial for some, it has also created new victims. Chinese officials
and scholars need to critically reflect on and adapt China’s developmental vision if it
truly intends to help human beings overcome the myriad challenges they face in their
daily lives.
Understanding China’s Engagement with Human Security
As a rising power, China has had to articulate a global vision that answers the question
of how human beings ought to be secured. The Chinese government therefore engaged
with the human security paradigm, which emerged in 1993 with the publication of a
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reports to challenge the political
realist–derived orthodoxy that employed a military-focused and state-centric approach
to security [71]. Human security thereby shifted the primary security referent from the
state to the human being by focusing on “freedom from want,” comprising
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development issues such as the provision of health care, education, and employment;
and on “freedom from fear,” comprising protection issues such as denoting liberation
from political oppression and physical harm. Proponents of human security welcomed
its all-encompassing scope by interrelating urgent and crucial issues that human beings
face on a daily-basis, ranging from poverty, climate change, environmental degrada-
tion, pandemic control, and food security to social and political rights. Such issues are
often analyzed separately across a variety of fields of study rather than as an intercon-
nected group [74].
Despite its focus on threats to human life and expansion of the concept of security,
the human security paradigm received a great deal of criticism. Critics charged that the
concept was vague [32], state-centric [46], and served neoliberal agendas [15], consti-
tuting no more than a form of colonial governance in a postcolonial world that
encourages resilience in the face of perennial threats [51, 60]. Scholars, such as Edward
Newman [46], sought to address these critiques by developing a Critical Human
Security Studies (CHSS) agenda. Newman’s embrace of Western-centric frameworks
that seek to liberate foreign others, however, raised a further critique that human
security implants Western approaches that fail to engage with the subaltern voice or
consider how human security is conceived of in different parts of the world. As Pasha
[51] and Shani [60] maintain, a critical understanding of human security has to focus on
how individuals articulate security concerns in their everyday lives and from their own
specific cultural and religious perspectives.
These critiques can all be applied to Western, especially European, states which have
linked their aid and human security policies to the idea of human rights and good
governance. In terms of freedom from fear, Western states have promoted non-
traditional norms of intervention—or what John Kabia [29] called “coercive humani-
tarian intervention”—in the post-Cold War environment to counter what they perceived
to be emerging security threats such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, failed states,
massacres, or crimes against humanity in international affairs. The introduction of
these norms resulted in more intrusive armed responses aimed at state-building,
humanitarian intervention, and peace enforcement, particularly on the African conti-
nent. In terms of freedom from want, following the publication of the World Bank
report in 1981 entitled “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda
for Action” by Elliot Berg [7], Western developed countries frequently imposed
“structural adjustment” programs comprising austerity and liberalization measures on
recipient countries in return for access to various forms of aid, investment, and loans. In
this vein, the Western countries, especially the European Union (EU), which identifies
itself as a normative power [37], regards itself as the “protector” or “ethical teacher” of
developing countries (in particular the African states). This constitutes a paternalistic
relationship, which is arguably, rooted in Europe’s colonial history.
Rather than accept these Western definitions of human security, China has under-
stood the concept based on its constructed self-identity as a state victimized through
imperialism that has emerged in the twenty-first century as a global power with
visionary ideas. In contrast to Western liberal states, China frames the concept of
human security differently in accordance with a traditional Sino-centric view of order
that perceives China’s relations with foreign states as benevolent and based on the
concept of non-interference. In addition, its constructed self-identity as a developing
state has resulted in its officials and scholars framing the concept of human security in
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terms of “freedom from want” and adopting a developmentalist approach to human
security. The fusion of the victim and visionary narratives is both pragmatic and
idealistic and can be seen to offer an alternative model to the West, by rivaling the
central tenets of Western approaches to human security that emphasize intervention,
neoliberal economic doctrine, democratization, and human rights. The following sub-
sections expand on how historical legacies, traditional worldviews, and specific devel-
opmental contexts have informed China’s approach to human security.
China’s Victim Narrative and Human Security
China’s victim narrative derives from what has been dubbed its “century of humilia-
tion,” a period of foreign domination spanning from the mid-nineteenth century Opium
Wars until the Chinese Communist Party victory in 1949. This was a period of national
weakness during which imperial powers intervened in China’s domestic affairs to
extract concessions spanning from trade to property rights. The contemporary narrative
argues that intervention came not only at the expense of the Chinese state, debilitating
its development and undermining its prestige, but also undercut the welfare of the
Chinese people themselves. The emphasis on securing China’s borders from external
intervention therefore became central to China’s identity narrative and sovereignty
became the core aspect of Chinese understandings of both national and human security.
To the Chinese government, if a country cannot protect its national sovereignty, then
there can be no human security for its people [41].
As Chinese scholars and foreign policymakers began engaging with the concept of
human security, so they also drew comparisons between Western interventions in the
post-Cold War era with China’s own “century of humiliation,” seeking to distinguish
China’s approach to human security from that of former imperial powers. From the
outset, Chinese policymakers were wary of Western interpretations of human security
that equated the concept with human rights issues and humanitarian intervention [12].1
Instead, they stressed that the inherent diversity of world politics must be respected. As
Xi Jinping noted, “[countries] differ in size, wealth and strength. They vary in historical
and cultural traditions as well as social systems, and have different security interests
and aspirations” [75]. China has long been promoting what it calls “a multipolar world”
and advocating “democracy” in international relations. Xi, in his remarks at the Fourth
Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia,
notes that security must be inclusive. He says
We should abide by the basic norms governing international relations such as
respecting sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and non-
interference in internal affairs, respect the social systems and development paths
chosen by countries on their own, and fully respect and accommodate the
legitimate security concerns of all parties. [75]
In this regard, national security and human security are interwoven and complimentary
to each other.
1 For a comprehensive review of China’s engagement with the concept of human security, see [12].
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At the same time, Xi’s statement is a call to understand security from specific
cultural and historical perspectives and is therefore a clear critique of the main-
stream, Western understanding of the universality of human security. Essentially,
China has battled with what it perceives as a Western notion of human security and
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) designed to facilitate interference in other countries’
domestic affairs, especially in the “third world.” China associates such invasive
approaches to its own experiences of foreign imperialist interventions during a
“century of humiliation.” Thus, China has been critical of the notion of “interven-
tion.” It has assiduously promoted “sovereignty” as a core value in its conception of
human security.2
The focus on sovereignty in China’s approach to security is apparent in Xi’s
comments at the first meeting of the newly founded National Security Commission
of the Communist Party on 15 April 2014. Xi asserted that China should “follow the
principle of people first, and maintain that everything done for national security is for
the sake of the people, by relying on the people, and through gaining the support from
the people” [16], making this a guiding principle in China’s security thinking. Elabo-
rating on this point to make a clear connection with many of the concerns that
encompass human security, Xi stated [16],
China should pay close attention to both traditional and non-traditional security
issues, and build a national security system that integrates such elements as
political, homeland, military, economic, cultural, social, science and technology,
information, ecological, resource, and nuclear security.
The Chinese leadership’s sensitivity towards Western understandings of human
security resulted in them seldom employing the concept in their official discourse;
one notable exception being former President Hu Jintao speech at the APEC Summit
in Chile in 2004, where he alluded to natural disasters like earthquakes, typhoons,
droughts, and tsunamis in terms of human security. Hu also promised that China
would actively support and participate in APEC’s disaster prevention, alleviation
and post-disaster reconstruction efforts, so as to effectively protect the security of
human life and property in the region [42]. Nevertheless, China’s wariness regarding
human security, the concept was translated in a variety of terms, such as “compre-
hensive security,” “new security,” and “people’s security” (人民安全), and became
embedded in Chinese domestic and international security policies, as Xi’s comments
above highlight.
Notwithstanding the differing uses of the above terms and some inherent contradic-
tions, in the last decade, Chinese conceptualizations of security have broadened to
incorporate the concerns of the UNDP 1994 definition of human security. The country
has increasingly moved towards a more comprehensive conception of security, includ-
ing human security that is grounded in a victim narrative.
2 Though it is beyond the scope of this article, China’s conception of sovereignty is contested by people in
Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong who seek a degree of political independence. The Chinese government does
not tolerate such challenges, arguably undermining the human security of Tibetans, Uighurs, and citizens of
Hong Kong.
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Sino-centric Order and Human Security
Rather than concentrating on foreign political intervention, the Chinese government
stresses win-win relations based on non-intervention and respect. This line of thought is
derived from the Chinese notion of legitimacy, which is originally grounded in the pre-
modern political idea, the mandate of heaven. The mandate of heaven ties in with the
propriety of the ruler, or the ruler’s virtue (德). It is important to note that the ideal of a
ruler’s virtue was not merely an ideological construct, but required actual material
benefits for the populace [18]. The way for rulers to secure the “hearts of the people”
(民心) was not only to possess “benevolence” (仁), but also to perform their duties well,
which is interpreted as assuring people’s safety and well-being. As long as the
leadership is able to demonstrate its benevolence to its citizens by assuring their
welfare, the citizens are believed to be willing to support their rulers rather than rise
up against them. The legitimacy of rulers was thus to a large extent performance-based.
The Chinese government has actively facilitated the work of scholars including Qin
Yaqing [55], Yan Xuetong [78], and Zhao Tingyang [81] who have embraced tradi-
tional Confucian ideas to justify CCP rule and China’s domestic and foreign policies,
including notions such as China’s “peaceful development” and “harmonious world”
[19, 33].
It is important to note that according to the rhetoric of a heavenly mandate, the
“benevolence” performed by the rulers (i.e., emperors) not only refers to the imperial
subjects (i.e., the Chinese people) but also to “foreigners,” (i.e., tributary states and
people living beyond the circle of tributary states). The imperial Chinese Sino-centric
system was portrayed as a model of benevolent governance reflecting core Confucian
values both internally and externally [49]. It signified an “attraction” of the outer
fringes of Chinese civilization to become part of the Sino-centric system. Chinese
emperors were considered to be Sons of Heaven, governing not just China but “all
under heaven,” or Tianxia.
Recent works on China’s international relations [17, 30, 80, 81] maintain that this
Tianxia mentality has influenced Chinese foreign policy. The contemporary narrative of
Tianxia in state and Sino-centric terms also shapes how China’s approach to human
security is defined in terms of an acceptance of top-down governance guaranteeing
economic development for the well-being of the people. As China continues its
economic successes, the role of the Chinese traditional worldview is likely to continue
to increase [82]. Policymakers are encouraged to incorporate the rhetoric of intellectual
work that supports the application of Chinese traditions in foreign policy. References to
China’s Confucian heritage in its foreign policy might not seem realistic and have been
critiqued for comprising a new hegemony [14], but they do sketch a global vision that
the Chinese government strives for.
China’s Developmental Experience and Human Security
The Chinese government maintains that human security should focus on economic
development, arguing that if the government fails to ensure the well-being of its people,
then the people will revolt against the government. Using China itself as an example,
the Chinese government frequently equates economic development with human secu-
rity when noting the achievement of lifting two-thirds of its population out of poverty
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since its reform and opening-up policy began in 1978 [26, 53]. The most recent poverty
alleviation campaign under Xi’s administration aims to eliminate all rural poverty by
2020 [67]. In addition to eliminating poverty, it says that China’s economic policies
have also rapidly improved the quality of life for the majority of its people, building a
Chinese society of relative prosperity in all respects. In the opinion of Chinese officials,
two historic leaps have been realized: first, from poverty to citizens having adequate
food and clothing, and second, from adequate food and clothing to the people becom-
ing relatively prosperous [24]. According to the Chinese government, the next step is to
transform China into a global manufacturing leader under the strategic plan called
“Made in China 2025” [65].
According to this rhetoric, the “right to development” is particularly highlighted.
The notion of “development” seems to be an all-inclusive key to the well-being of the
people, or human security. For the Chinese government, the right to development is a
fundamental human right and of primary importance. Xi has promoted the notion of
sustainable security on various occasions. He elaborates on this concept as follows
[We] need to focus on both development and security so that security would be
durable. As a Chinese saying goes, for a tree to grow tall, a strong and solid root
is required; for a river to reach far, an unimpeded source is necessary. Develop-
ment is the foundation of security, and security the precondition for development.
The tree of peace does not grow on barren land while the fruit of development is
not produced amidst flames of war… [Development] means the greatest security
and the master key to regional security issues. [75]
In this vein, development is not only the key to securing freedom from want but also a
way to attain freedom from fear. The best remedy for conflict and instability is
sustained economic development. For example, Hu Jintao’s New Security Concept
stressed that “it would not be possible to attain peace without achieving socio-economic
development and the pursuit of economic development in conflict areas should be an
integral part of any peacekeeping effort” [50]. To Beijing, armed conflicts are merely a
“symptom,” whereas socio-economic development should be regarded as the root
cause. Moreover, in Beijing’s rhetoric, only if one is independent economically, can
one be independent politically. Protecting one’s sovereignty therefore achieves human
security for one’s people. Thus, for the Chinese government, the best strategy for
promoting human security is to focus on such issues as reducing poverty through
development. While such strategies are not overtly directed to improving freedom from
fear issues such as civil rights, the Chinese government asserts that the people do gain
better access to health care, education, and resources. According to the Chinese
government, by accessing such resources, communities are better able to confront the
freedom from fear issues they face.
The equation of freedom from want preceding and resolving freedom from fear
issues is apparent in all aspects of China’s engagement with the notion of human
security. For example, Chinese officials claim that improving the region’s economy
through the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) Initiative could weaken
the root causes of terrorism and help stabilize Central Asia and the Middle East. As Xi
notes, “we need to advance the process of common development and regional
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integration, foster sound interactions and synchronized progress of regional economic
cooperation and security cooperation, and promote sustainable security through sus-
tainable development” [75]. This hybrid conception contrasts with Western understand-
ings of human security that differentiate “freedom from want” from “freedom from
fear,” with a focus on the latter, i.e., individual political rights such as freedom of
speech, assembly, and religion.
China’s interpretation of human security to emphasize freedom from want issues is
also due to its identification as a Third World developing country that has just recently
transformed itself from a former aid recipient into an aid donor. Brautigam [9–11], in
her studies of China’s role in Africa, discussed China’s domestic history extensively as
she believes that this is pivotal to understanding the rationale behind China’s strategic
goals as well as the implications these actions might have on the development of
African countries. To Brautigam, the role China plays in being a development aid donor
in Africa originates in the experiences China had itself with regard to developing its
own nation and the aid it received from Japan. Indeed, China can be said to have
adapted its strategies from the aid it itself has received from Japan [62].3 As Brautigam
[9 p. 60] states,
China’s aid – like Japan’s – is influenced by a regional pattern: the developmental
state. Over time, foreign aid has become one tool in a range of economic instru-
ments adeptly managed by China’s state leaders to boost China’s exports and its
own development. Aid and other benefits are used not only to support the devel-
opment of recipients, but to foster trade, help build competitive Chinese multina-
tional corporations, and encourage the upgrading of China’s own domestic firms.
China’s stance on providing development aid was significantly influenced by its
constructed self-identity as both a “developing” and “developmental” state—with
centrally planned interventions designed to boost production, infrastructure, and trade.
China has tried to sell its own experiences and the development model, perceiving
China’s achievements as a blueprint for the development of the “Third World,”
especially for countries in Africa. Providing such a blueprint is something that Chinese
officials have argued the West has not managed to achieve with their aid and human
security policies. In short, the Chinese aid and economic cooperation programs,
interpreted as human security, have been heavily shaped by its own experience of
development. China’s interpretation of human security can be observed in the country’s
engagement with Africa and how its understanding of human security has been
mobilized in response to critics of China’s Africa policy.
China’s Engagement with Human Security in Africa
Contrary to the West, China’s discourse of human security has stressed its win-win
approach to aiding African countries and promoted the idea that there exists a feeling of
3 The real difference between China and Japan’s aid policies is that Japan, as a DAC member, has had to
implement policies relating to human rights, rule of law, and good governance.
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similarity and even solidarity between China as a donor and the recipient nations. With
regard to freedom from want issue, China has not required that political or ethical
conditions be attached to their development aid and business contracts [15, 31]. While
Western countries often find it hard to work cooperatively with local African partners
because of certain ethical and political considerations, China asserts that it follows a
policy of non-interference that emphasizes the principles of equality of state sovereign-
ty. The origin of China’s non-intervention aid model can be found in former premier
Zhou Enlai’s articulation of the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical
Assistance to Other Countries in 1964, which stated that “the Chinese government
strictly respects the sovereignty of recipient countries, and never attaches any condi-
tions or asks for any privileges” [40]. This principle of non-political conditionality
remains in China’s contemporary foreign aid rhetoric. While this may be seen as a flaw
of China’s human security policy by some of its critics (e.g. [4]), the Chinese govern-
ment asserts that it respects the customs and regulations of African nations and does not
impose its own ideals on them.
For instance, during his tour of Africa in 2006, the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
said “China was the victim of colonial aggression. The Chinese nation knows too well
the suffering caused by colonial rule and the need to fight colonialism” [52]. It is this
“shared” experience as victim of colonialism that is used to justify China’s non-
intervention aid model in Africa. By doing so, China has been able to rhetorically
position itself as a collaborative partner for Africa emphasizing win-win relations and
striving for a more harmonious world in which there is no place for (neo) colonial or
(neo) imperial aggression. The fact that China does not have a record of a violent
historical presence in Africa characterized by slavery, imperialism, or intervening in the
domestic affairs of African states has been an advantage in promoting its case. Chinese
officials continue to base their rhetoric on “Chinese exceptionalism” as they maintain
that China sees Sino-African relations as a reciprocal relationship based on mutual
benefit rather than on colonial intentions [2], echoing the “China as victim” and
“benevolent leader” discourses outlined earlier in the paper.
China’s rhetoric of “mutual benefit” is designed to justify a business-oriented
approach to human security, in which China focuses on commercial and economic
transactions that are aimed at facilitating both further economic growth in China and
individual African countries [5]. Investment, rather than grant aid, has therefore proven
key to China’s development policy. China connects development aid with corporate
business through new and innovative methods.
As Dreher et al. [21] note, China’s overseas development aid is broadly defined in
line with the one suggested by the OECD Development Assistance Committee. Yet, it
is more flexible in practice, combined with grants, trade, investment, and loans.
According to OECD definition [48], international aid to developing countries is divided
into two categories: Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flow
(OOF). The latter is defined as official sector transaction that does not meet the former’s
criteria—i.e., having a grant element of less than 25%. China’s aid to African countries
includes both ODA and OOF, but in terms of proportion, its OOF far outweighs its
ODA. According to Dreher, et al. [20], only 23% of China’s foreign aid funding is
considered as ODA while other 77% is OOF. The U.S. is just the opposite, in which
93% of its foreign aid expenditure is ODA. As China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid
[64] stresses, China aims to help recipient countries improve their independent
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development capabilities, being able to use their own resources and gradually becom-
ing self-reliant. China regards its foreign aid as mutual assistance among developing
countries, or what is called the “South-South Cooperation.” In this process, China and
the recipient countries can simultaneously benefit each other. By establishing mutually
beneficial partnerships, the Chinese government maintains that it can pursue the
national interests of both itself and the African states at once.
China’s mutually beneficial model is justified by the rhetoric of “poor helping poor.”
As noted in the previous section, China’s idea and practice of human security is largely
shaped by its own developmental experience. After China’s Reform and Opening Up,
China’s achievements in eliminating domestic poverty without overly relying on
foreign aid were well acknowledged, and that experience strengthened its confidence
in assisting other developing countries. Under Mao Zedong, China’s approach to
alleviating domestic poverty mainly consisted of allocating state’s funds and subsidies
directly to poor areas in the country. However, after the Reform and Opening Up, state
funds became more restricted due to the introduction of a market economy to China. As
a result, China gradually moved to a development-type of poverty alleviation, wherein
the government introduced industrial and commercial investment in poor areas, aiming
to develop natural or human resources so as to increase productivity. Since the 1980s,
this approach to poverty alleviation has proved to be successful. Chinese experiences of
its domestic poverty alleviation in turn shaped Beijing’s view on international aid.
From the 1980s, Beijing began to amend its international aid strategies and incorporate
the concept of development-type poverty alleviation—a combination of investment
with aid [36]. As Deng Xiaoping famously noted, China (under Mao) had been “too
enthusiastic thereby encouraging Africans to depend on us (China)” [79] leading to a
misuse of aid funds. After 1995, foreign aid was officially merged with investment and
loans [54], to become “typical development aid” [35].
China’s win-win approach to adding African countries is not simply self-serving
instrumental rhetoric, but is based on an official understanding of how China’s ap-
proach to alleviating poverty at home could be a model to export abroad through its aid
policy. This also explains why China’s approach to international development is
different from developed countries, especially those in the West. Though China’s
economy has boomed, Chinese White Papers on Foreign Aid continue to identify
China as a developing country [64], depicting China’s aid as a model of “poor helping
poor.” As Xi [76] noted in Global Poverty Reduction and Development Forum in 2015
We adhere to the development-oriented approach to poverty alleviation, and
regard development as the fundamental way to solve poverty, both to help the
poor and to motivate them, and to mobilize the enthusiasm of the people who are
helping the poor … while committed to eliminating poverty on their own, we
have always actively carried out South-South cooperation to the best of our
ability and to other developing countries. Provide assistance without any political
conditions to support and help the majority of developing countries, especially
the least developed countries, to eradicate poverty.
In short, the transformation of China’s foreign aid lies in the careful use of foreign aid
funds. The Chinese government argues that its mutually beneficial model has achieved
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notable successes and is more sustainable. Over the past two decades, China has been
active in setting up business deals with African countries [9]. Many of these invest-
ments come in a package form, together with aid and loans. Between 1980 and 2000,
Sino-African trade increased from $1 billion to $10 billion [72]. By 2005, this number
had reached $39.7 and in 2006 to $55 billion, making China Africa’s second largest
trading partner (after the U.S.) [23]. This number keeps increasing; in 2017, it reached
$170 billion [39]. During the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit
of December 2015 in Johannesburg, President Xi promised to invest an additional $60
billion over the next 3 years in loans and aid to the African Continent [13].
Notably, Chinese aid and economic cooperation programs have emphasized infra-
structure and production fields, which Western donors have downplayed in recent years
[9, 22]. Over sixty percentage of China’s concessional loans are invested in Africa’s
infrastructure such as transportation, communications, and power [64]. To Beijing,
infrastructure would attract more investment, creating more employment opportunities
and finally alleviating poverty. As stated by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson,
“Chinese companies have built a lot of highways, railways, ports, airports and com-
munication facilities, greatly improving Africa’s economic development environment
and helping Africa attract foreign investment” [77]. He further insisted that attention
should be paid “to both the economic and social benefits of projects and increasing
African countries’ ability for independent and sustainable development” [77]. China
has achieved success in some infrastructure areas. For instance, according to the
International Energy Agency report [27] which examines China’s involvement in
Africa’s electricity supply systems, while sub-Saharan Africa is still facing major
electrification challenges, Chinese investment between 2010 and 2015 accounted for
$13 billion in financing for infrastructure development, benefiting more than 635
million people living without electricity in sub-Saharan Africa. “African countries have
relied heavily on China to support the expansion of their electricity systems, to enable
growth and improve living standards,” said Paul Simons, the IEA’s Deputy Executive
Director [28].
China has recently been interested in providing investment and aid to support
factories that manufacture goods for export too. Chinese companies have increasingly
started to outsource their manufacturing to Africa. Through establishing Special Eco-
nomic Zones (SEZs) in some of Africa’s biggest economic hubs such as Egypt, Nigeria,
South Africa, and Zambia, China aims to replicate its own development model in which
export-oriented industrial hubs were able to appeal to big multinational corporations.
These corporations would then invest large sums of money in the local economy, and
thereby facilitate continental economic growth. The Chinese government asserts that
this resulted in a win-win situation with Chinese wages in the manufacturing sector
soaring through the roof, and the rapid increase in Chinese purchasing power which
forced Chinese companies to look outside of its national borders in order to maintain
their profit margin [3]. In doing so, it created a lot of extra employment in Africa as it
aided the continent in establishing a well-functioning manufacturing industry, giving a
significant boost to the African economy. Clearly, China’s developmental experience
informs how Chinese policymakers frame what they perceive as their benevolent aid
policy towards African states.
The Chinese government argues that its new approach to Africa has shaped new
business opportunities that, in addition to facilitating further economic growth and
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industrial transformation in China, have helped to strengthen the sustainable develop-
ment of African economies and raised local people out of poverty. To make their case,
Chinese policymakers point to joint-ventures such as the one between Chinese oil
company Sinopec and the South African firm PetroSA in 2012. They looked into
options for constructing a $10 billion oil refinery near the port city of Durban [44].
South Africa does not possess an abundance of gas and oil reserves that some of its
neighbors have, and is thus almost completely dependent on oil and gas imports [70].
The Chinese/South African refinery has therefore been designed to supply the South
African energy sector, and to strengthen South African energy security, and not for
resource exports to China.
The aid programs and economic cooperation between developing countries cannot
be sustained unless they benefit both partners. As argued by Brautigam, critics should
consider Chinese claims that its aid fosters mutual benefit, as China is a developing
country with deep poverty in many regions. She argues that it would be “irresponsible
to set aside large amounts of funding for the sole benefit of other countries, many with
higher income levels” [9]. In this way, China’s developmental aid over the years can be
regarded as a relationship between donor and recipient as one of “a partnership, not a
one way transfer of charity” [9]. Chinese officials maintain that they have been able
adjust their African strategy and the way China conducts its business according to local
customs, in order to respond to critiques of its policy and to become a genuine
collaborative partner for African states. By stimulating the establishment of mutually
beneficial partnerships between local and Chinese corporations, China hopes to pursue
the national interests of both itself and the African states at once.
In short, China’s aid and investment relations with African states are informed by its
constructed identity narratives that emphasize China’s benevolence and non-interfer-
ence. Through a rhetoric of “mutual benefit,” Chinese leaders extoll the benefits of
development, not only for African economies but also in terms of spillover effects that
enrich society as a whole and realize human security goals by alleviating poverty. It
remains to be seen, however, whether China’s Africa policy can truly be said to bolster
the security of human beings.
China’s “Win-Win” Rhetoric and Human Insecurity
China’s rhetoric of “mutually beneficial” outcomes in its relations with Africa and the
benefits accrued to local communities can be challenged, raising the question of whether
communities have become more insecure as a result. First, references to Confucian
thought and the emphasis on a Chinese developmental model depict the Chinese state as
the dominant actor that has the authority to enact and implement human security
policies. As a result, Chinese foreign policymakers and businesses have eagerly engaged
African elites, ignoring resistance from local communities which have borne the brunt of
China’s commercial activities [43]. For example, Chinese commercial investments in
Zambia’s copper mining industry, supported with funds from the Chinese government,
led to numerous charges of worker abuse and exploitation and poor safety and health
standards [34]. The emphasis in commercial profit over worker safety culminated in a
major industrial disaster at the Chinese-owned Beijing General Research Institute of
Mining and Metallurgy in Chambishi in April 2005, killing 52 workers [34].
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In addition, China’s collusion with African elites to forcibly appropriate agricultural
land in Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe, among others, harks back to Maoist policies
to industrialize the countryside at the expense of the rural poor [57]. Another aspect of
China’s foreign policy that has angered Africa’s non-elite has been the tendency to
import workers from China rather than to hire locally [1]. In response to China’s
approach, Chinese workers in Nigeria have been kidnapped and demonstrations have
taken place in Angola, for example [57]. Chinese foreign policymakers allow little
room for these bottom-up critiques as their foreign policy rhetoric is infused with
hierarchical Confucian thinking and an emphasis on the supposedly “unique” qualities
of its developmental model.
Second, the “uniqueness” of China’s developmental approach can be questioned, as
China learned from the Japanese model of development, incorporating key aspects of
Japan’s aid policy. China’s developmental approach has also failed to consider how
development itself is rooted in colonial discourse and practice and how it creates a poor,
needy other for “our” strong, advanced societies to transform in “our” image, to be like
“us,” but never become “us.” In a way, China’s resource politics on the African
continent are quite similar to the behavior of imperialist powers; a comparison that
critics outside Africa’s elite have made [2, 57].
Third, Chinese attempts to differentiate its foreign policy to Africa from former
imperialist powers lie in an emphasis on its victim narrative. This victim narrative
magnifies the notion of China’s glorious economic rise and success at alleviating
poverty domestically, without due consideration for the shortcomings of China’s own
developmental experiences, including inequality, property rights, and pollution. China’s
victim narrative and confidence in its own developmental successes inhibits any
consideration that China’s foreign policy may be creating its own victims.
Forth, the emphasis on sovereignty in Chinese interpretations of human security
indicates that national interests, or more specifically national survival, are the supreme,
if not the only concern of Chinese foreign policymakers. As human security reflects the
interests of the state, it encourages its policymakers to arbitrarily exclude (or include)
systems of thought to realize the national interest. China’s state-centric approach has
encouraged numerous critics to charge that China’s foreign policy in Africa is con-
cerned with exerting geopolitical or geo-economic influence in exchange for political
returns and privileges from African countries. This political influence China is geared
to obtaining African countries’ support in international relations, such as backing
China’s approaches to South China Sea dispute or China’s “One China Principle”
[58], or to back China’s stance in international fora, such as mirroring Chinese votes in
the UN General Assembly [20]. Alternatively, critics assert that China is engaged in
“debt trap diplomacy” in Africa, as a means to gain strategic leverage over African
states [8, 73]. Following China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI), the Center for Global
Development likewise believes that China’s large-scale infrastructure poses a signifi-
cant debt risk to recipient countries. Key financing countries under the BRI including
Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya are all likely to face debt crisis [25].4
Fifth, it is important to highlight that China’s discourse is inherently contradictory. The
concept of Tianxia designates unequal relations between the core, China, and the periphery,
4 Some of these Western critiques might be hypocritical since it was the policies of international financial
institutions and Western states that got African states into debt in the first place.
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Africa. This contradicts China’s win-win discourse based on equal relations between China
and African states and “poor helping poor.” China’s victim narrative and claims to be a
developing state also sit uneasily with China’s economic rise and articulation of a global
vision based on its supposedly “unique” developmental experience. By appropriating this
developmentalist discourse from Japan, China’s foreign policy rhetoric undermines the
notion of “China as a victim” in the sense that Japan is demonized in China’s foreign policy
discourse, while being a contributor to China’s development success.
In sum, the rhetorical basis of China’s foreign policy towards Africa derives from its
Confucian traditions, victim narrative, and developmental experience. None of this
rhetoric enables a critical self-reflection about the downsides of China’s developmental
model or approach to foreign aid. In terms of human insecurity, land grabs, exploitation
of workers, and environmental destruction are among the numerous charges leveled at
the Chinese government and businesses operating in Africa. Without a re-evaluation of
Chinese rhetoric that allows for voices from the grassroots to be heard, Chinese foreign
policy practices are unlikely to change.
Conclusion
Numerous accounts by academics, think tanks, policymakers, and the media continue to
characterize China’s Africa policy in terms of neocolonialism. The Chinese government has
sought to develop a foreign policy that engages with the notion of human security in order to
challenge these critics. For the Chinese government, human security is primarily focused on
development and modernization. These are processes which Chinese officials comprehend
in terms of their own country’s history and constructed self-identity. In Africa, China’s non-
interference and “win-win” approach forms the basis of the Chinese government’s rhetoric
to distinguish the Chinese approach from the invasive and paternalisticWest. In some ways,
both theWestern critics and the Chinese proponents of China’s Africa policy rely on similar
discourses of neocolonialism to make their point.
Most critiques of China’s foreign policy towards Africa have focused on exposing
the impacts and practices of Chinese aid, they have not considered the rhetoric on
which Sino-African relations are based. This lack of consideration for China’s rhetoric
is due to a specific understanding of human security that emphasizes interventions,
neoliberal economic theory and practice, democratization, good governance, and
human rights. Taking China’s foreign policy rhetoric seriously enables a reconsidera-
tion of how Chinese foreign policymakers are able to sustain their relations with
African elites in the public domain. At the same time, a critical review of this rhetoric
exposes how the discursive foundations on which it is based inhibit self-reflection and a
reconsideration of how China’s actions in Africa may be undermining human security.
While China’s Africa policy has certainly created employment, enhanced trade, and built
crucial infrastructure, the benefits have predominantly accrued to Africa’s elite in many
cases. The focus of China’s policy towards Africa with its win-win rhetoric is about securing
business interests and thereby advances an exploitative neoliberal agenda. With time,
perhaps wages on the African continent will rise, but only as cultures are replaced with
neoliberal ideology, land is appropriated, workers exploited, and the environment despoiled.
A critical approach to human security should involve communities being at the center of the
decision-making process; determining what are threats to their community and how these
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threats should be tackled. In contrast, China’s Africa policy clearly raises numerous concerns
about how human beings are made insecure through land grabs, environmental degradation,
or exploitation in the workplace. Even when Chinese foreign policymakers and corporate
elites have adjusted their policies in response toAfrican protests about the impacts of China’s
foreign and commercial practices, these adjustments have been both reactive and incremen-
tal. If China cannot find a more effective way to tackle human security concerns in Africa,
then Chinese people and firms will continue to face protests on the continent, including
violent resistance [47], as well as to encourage the view that China’s approach is anything
but “win-win.”
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